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States. 
The  problems  Roosevelt  faced  sixty  years  ago  and  the 
problems  confronting  President  Clinton  resonate.  Roosevelt 
inherited  a  failed  capitalism  and  a new  model  capitalism  was 
put  in  place  during  his  first  term  (1933-1937).  Roosevelt's 
new  model  served  the  United  States,  and  the  world,  well  for 
almost  half  a  century. 
Over  the  past  dozen  or  so  years  the  1933-1937  model  has 
shown  its  age.  Although  it  has  not  broken  down  as 
completely  as  the  older  laissez-faire  model  had  over  the 
1929-33  period,  quite  clearly  our  current  model  of 
capitalism  needs  to  be  at  least  thoroughly  overhauled  if  not 
replaced.  Whether  he  realizes  it  or  not,  the  historic  task 
of  President  Clinton  is  to  discover  and  put  in  place  a new 
model  capitalism. 
The  usual  description  of  the  1933  bank  holiday  is 
"Roosevelt  closed  the  banks."  This  is  not  true.  By  March 
4th  1933  the  banks  in  some  30  states  had  been  closed  by  the 
Governors  of  the  states.  On  Saturday  March  4,  as  Roosevelt 
was  being  inaugurated  he  was  informed  that  the  New  York banks would not open on Monday March  6.  The bank holiday 
was a preemptive  strike - it was forced upon Roosevelt. 
This act moved the solution  of the problem  of illiquid  and 
insolvent  banks  and other financial  institutions  from the 
Financial  Community  to the Federal  Government.1 
The bank holiday  was the climactic  event of a great 
contraction  of the American  economy that began  in October 
1929 and lasted until March  1933 - more than 40 months  of 
monotonic  decline.  The decline was not only long, it was 
also deep.  Output  fell by about 33%, prices  fell by about 
33%, and the indices of stock prices  (The Dow Jones or the 
Standard  and Poors)  fell by some 85%.  In the winter  of 
1932/33 unemployment  was at least 25% of the labor force; 
this  in a country where  l/3 of the labor force was in 
agriculture. 
Sixty years ago capitalism  was a failed economic  order 
in the United  States and throughout  the world.2  Today as 
the  call for this conference  notes  "the whole world  is 
capitalist".  We have to address the following  questions 
1)  -  "What flaws made capitalism  a failure  in 1933?", 
2)  "What turned  a failed system into a success?"  and 
3)  "Were the capitalism  that failed and the capitalism 
that  succeeded  the same economic  order?". 
l.In the crisis of 1907 the House of Morgan played  a central 
part  in resolving  the crisis.  In the crisis  of 1933 the 
government  through  the Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation 
played  the central part  in resolving  the crisis. 
2.  We should recall that Hitler became  Chancellor  on 
January  20th.  Although  Roosevelt  was elected  in November  of 
1932 Hoover  remained President  until Noon on March  4, 1933. Even as we celebrate  the "victory" of capitalism  we are 
aware of the current problems  and crises of the once very 
successful  post war capitalisms.  While the capitalisms  of 
the United  States and Western  Europe were truly  successful 
societies  during the first two and a half decades  after the 
second world war, their performance  over the last decade  and 
a half  falls short of the standard achieved  earlier.  Japan, 
which  seemed to have escaped many of the problems  besetting 
the United  States and Western  Europe  in the past decade,  now 
seems to be catching  up.  We add two questions  to our list: 
4)  "What attenuated  the success of the early post war 
capitalism?" 
5)  "Why are the welfare  states of the post war world 
now in crisis?" 
One reason capitalism  won and the Soviet version  of 
socialism  lost was that the Lenin-Stalin  version  of 
socialism  allowed  for only one form, the highly  centralized 
linear command model,  whereas,  as the call for this 
conference  recognizes,  capitalism  comes in many  forms.  3  The 
successful  capitalisms  of the 1950's through  the 1970's were 
not the same as the capitalisms  that failed in the  1930's. 
In general  a system which we can characterize  as a small 
government  gold standard  constrained  laissez-faire 
capitalism  was replaced by a big government  flexible  central 
3.  At one time the slogan of the Heinz pickle  and ketchup 
company was  "57 Varieties".  When  I make the point  about the 
varieties  of capitalism  In America,  I often say that  "There 
are as many varieties  of Capitalism  as Heinz has of 
pickles." bank  interventionist  capitalism.  As  Kalecki  and  Jerome  Levy 
pointed  out,  a government  deficit  is  the  equivalent  of 
investment  as  far  as  the  maintaining  of  the  profits  of 
enterprise  is  concerned.  The  big  government  capitalism  put 
in  place  in  the  1930's  and  after  World  War  II  were  and  still 
are  protected  from  a  severe  fall  in  aggregate  profits,  such 
as  occurred  in  the  great  contraction  of  1929-33. 
Most  acutely  the  crisis  that  confronted  Roosevelt 
consisted  of  the  high  unemployment  rates,  bankrupt 
businesses  and  farms,  and  the  virtual  destruction  of  the 
financial  system.  Until  the  discovery  of  the  power  of 
government  contracts  for  defense  production  to  spur  civilian 
employment  the  Roosevelt  government  resorted  to  a variety  of 
inadequately  funded  government  employment  devices  to  offset 
the  weakness  of  the  private  demand  for  labor. 
The  reconstitution  of  the  financial  structure  was  a 
major  task  and  it  involved  a great  deal  of  thought  and 
negotiation.  It  was  not  until  1936  that  the  new  financial 
structure  was  in  place.  The  1936  financial  structure  of  the 
United  States  was  based  upon  two  principles, 
compartmentalization  and  transparency.  The  financial 
structure  was  reconstituted  with  special  financial 
organizations  for  delineated  functions  i.e.  housing, 
agriculture,  imports  and  exports,  commercial  banking, 
investment  banking  and  deposit  insurance.  A  government 
investment  bank,  the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation, 
infused  government  equity  into  transportation,  industry  and finance.4  The operations  of the publicly  traded 
corporations  and the markets  in which the trading  took place 
were to be transparent.  In addition the Federal  Reserve  was 
reorganized  in quite  fundamental  ways. 
The financial  institutions  of the post  1936 era 
differed  markedly  from that which broke down between  1929 
and 1933.  This system once in place began to evolve  in 
response  to the profit  seeking efforts  of the various 
institutions:  any institutional  structure which  sets limits 
to the behavior  of economic  units will set off actions 
designed  to evade or avoid the limits.  Furthermore 
technological  changes will impinge upon units  in the 
financial  structure  in quite varied ways.  As a result even 
though  the Roosevelt  structure  remained  in place,  the 
details  of financial  operations  and institutions  changed. 
In particular  households,  firms, government  units  as well as 
financial  institutions  learned how the system worked  and 
adapted their behavior  to best exploit the changing 
financial  environment.  These changes  led the greater  use of 
debt relative  to internal  finance as well as the use of debt 
to acquire existing  assets.  As a result the once robust 
financial  system became  increasingly  fragile.  As fragility 
4.  The public  infusion  of equity took the form of the RFC 
acquiring  a special  issue of preferred  stock.  The RFC did 
not hesitate  to exercise  its power by replacing  managements 
that were deemed to be weak.  As recovery took place  and the 
banks,  railroads  and ordinary businesses  that had been 
refinanced  by the RFC made profits  they purchased  or retired 
the preferred  stock issues.  See Jessie Jones  "50 Billion 
Dollars" implies that there may be large responses  to small stimuli, 
a fragile  structure  is an unstable  structure. 
Whereas  there was no threat  of a financial  crisis 
between  the end of World War  II and 1968, the repercussions 
of the commercial  paper market to the default  of the Penn 
Central  Railroad  on its commercial  paper  rudely awakened  the 
rather complacent  Federal  Reserve Board of Governors  that  it 
has responsibilities  for maintaining  the stability  of the 
financial  system.  Since 1968 the Federal Reserve  has often 
been  forced to take steps to abort what it deems to be an 
embryonic  financial  crisis. 
The capitalisms  that failed and the capitalisms  that 
succeeded  were different  in details that are significant  for 
their performance.  The big government  capitalisms  of the 
1950's and 60's succeeded  in moderating  business  cycles 
because  the big governments  were able to sustain business 
profits  when  investment  lagged.  One significant  result of 
profits  being  sustained  was that the absence  of long 
recessions  strengthened  trade unions.  The combination  of 
strong trade unions,  a lack of severe labor redundancy  and 
the social  legislation  that marked this era led to the lot 
of those  at the  "bottom" of the income distribution 
improving. 
President  Kennedy  caught the flavor of the experience 
of these years  in an aphorism  "A rising tide  lifts all 
boats."  This aphorism was validated  by the experience  of 
the 1950's and 60's, just as it was negated by the experience  of 1980's, when the lot of those at the bottom 
either deteriorated  or stagnated even though  aggregate 
income presumably  rose.  It seems clear that capitalisms  can 
function  in different  ways and that preference  systems  and 
the technical  conditions  of production  do not lead to a "law 
of distribution." 
If capitalisms  are to be successful  in the 21st century 
they are likely to be quite different  from the models  we are 
familiar  with.  Now that Roosevelt's  new model  of capitalism 
has shown that Kennedy's  aphorism  can be true, the ends that 
a successful  economy needs to achieve  includes  a wide 
distribution  of the fruits of prosperity  than was achieved 
over extended  periods  of time by the old model  capitalism. 
Reagan  and Thatcher tried to overthrow  the big government 
interventionist  capitalisms  that they inherited.  In the 
United  States the major  substantive  changes  in the economy 
of the Reagan  years were  1) the destruction  of the revenue 
system,  2) the emergence  of an economy that was structurally 
dependent  upon the government's  deficit  financing  of a 
budget  that was mainly  devoted to military  spending  and to 
supporting  consumption,  3) the fall in the real wage of a 
large portion  of the labor force and 4) a rising tide of un 
and under employment. 
After  a spurious prosperity,  largely based upon  1) an 
unproductive  government  deficit,  2) an enormous  expansion  of 
the financial  services  industry and 3) Ponzi  financing 
schemes that left the country with an excess  supply of office  structures  and highly  indebted  firms, the Reagan-Bush 
years  saw the economy  of the United  States stagnate. 
Furthermore  government  spending was even more  inefficient  in 
the use of government  to create resources  than before  Reagan 
and Bush took office because  the great expansion  of the 
government  deficit  left the budget with a huge  item 
"interest  on the debt". 
The Reagan-Bush  experience  is a second failure  of the 
laissez-faire  model.  It showed that the laissez-faire  model 
cannot meet the standards  established  in the  1950's and 
1960's, the era when capitalism  achieved  a practical  best. 
Clinton  in his still new administration  is groping  towards 
the invention  of a "new" new capitalism.  This new model 
accepts the central tenet of Rooseveltian  capitalism,  which 
is that effective  capitalism  requires  a large government 
sector, but  it shifts government  spending  from financing 
defense  and consumption  to financing  resource  creation  and 
the efficient  delivery  of services  for which the fee for 
services mechanisms  for the recovery  of costs are not 
effective.  This leads to another question: 
6).  "Can we discern  the general  outlines  of a new 
capitalism  that may emerge  in the United  States?" 
I have raised six rather overlapping  questions.  I have 
addressed  some in my exposition  of the problems.  I have not 
addressed  the questions  of what are the flaws that made 
capitalism  a failure  in 1933 and whether  these  flaws are the 
result of attributes  of capitalism  which are essential characteristics  of capitalism.  I will also address the 
question  of what turned the failed system into at least a 
transitory  success. 
One striking  flaw of capitalism  - which was identified 
by Marx  and Keynes  - is its inability to maintain  a close 
approximation  to full employment  over extended periods  of 
time.  Keynes  recognized  that capitalism  is not merely  a 
market  economy:  it is also a financial  system.  A 
fundamental  aspect of the capitalism  of Keynes'  time and 
ours is that there are two sets of prices.  One set consists 
of the prices  of current output and the other set consists 
of the prices  of assets, both the capital  assets used by 
firms in production  and the financial  instruments  that  firms 
issue in order to gain control of the fixed and working 
capital  they need.5  The price  of current  output carries 
profits  and is the mechanism  by which costs are recovered. 
In the abstract  these prices  are keyed to the money wage 
rate.  The price  of capital assets and financial  instruments 
are present  prices  for future streams of incomes.  As these 
two sets of prices  reflect what happens  in two different 
sets of markets  they will vary independently. 
The financial  instruments  issued by firms are held by 
households  and financial  institutions  such as banks.6  Ever 
5.  See Hyman P. Minsky,  John Maynard  Keynes,  Columbia 
University  Press,  1975 and Stabilizing  an Unstable  Economy, 
Yale University  Press  1986. 
6.  In a modern  economy household  and government  debts exist 
and are held by financial  institutions  and directly  by 
households.  These other liabilities  complicate  the cash 
flows and offer routes which can dampen  and amplify the since the corporation  became  the dominant  form of business 
organization,  the liabilities  of firm's include equity 
shares as well as various  forms of debts.  The equity  shares 
and some of the debts of some companies  are freely traded  on 
public  markets:  the market  value of these  instruments 
depends  upon publicly  available  information.  In principle 
the second price  level of capitalist  economies  is an index 
of the market  price  of existing  capital assets but in 
practice  it is an index of the market price  of shares and 
debts.  The growth  of the holding  company  form of corporate 
capitalism  means that entire  lines of business  are sold and 
bought.  The model  of the second price  level needs to 
incorporate  how such components  are valued. 
The reforms  of the financial  system during the 
Roosevelt  era made transparency  the over riding principle, 
guiding  the information  available  about the operations  of 
corporations  and of markets  on which equity  shares are 
traded.  Other debts of corporations  do not depend upon 
publicly  available  information  but rather on negotiation  and 
discovery:  these  are debts to banks and private  placements 
to other  financial  institutions.  Such debts, which  are not 
marketable  can be syndicated  among institutions,  such as 
banks,  which  are knowledgeable  about processing  private 
information. 
effect  of the debt structure  on the performance  of the 
economy. As a  result  of  the  security  market  reforms  of  the 
Roosevelt  era  the  law  caught  up  with  the  fact  that  modern 
capitalism  is  corporate  capitalism. 
Over  the  more  than  40  months  of  the  great  contraction 
the  price  level  of  current  output  fell  by  33%  whereas  the 
price  level  of  equities  on  the  stock  exchanges  fell  by  85%. 
In 1933  it would  cost  67%  of  the  1929  price  to  produce 
investment  output  but  it  would  only  cost  15%  of  the  1929 
price  to  purchase  a  firm  on  the  stock  exchange.  Similar 
ratios  held  for  commercial  buildings  such  as  office  towers. 
If  the  ratio  of  the  prices  of  old  and  new  capital  assets  was 
greater  than  1 to  1 before  1929,  in  1933  the  ratio  of  old  to 
new  was  1 to  4.  In  1933  no  one  would  order  new  investment 
output  when  the  second  hand  market  for  investment,  the 
market  for  capital  assets,  was  full  of  bargains. 
In  standard  economic  theory  prices  are  the  terms  upon 
which  alternative  goods  and  services  are  available.  As  the 
theory  is  set  up  all  that  really  matters  are  relative 
prices.  However  to  producers  in  a capitalist  economy  output 
prices  recapture  wage and material  costs and carry profits. 
Profits  enable  a firm to pay the interest  and principle  that 
is due on debts,  and to provide  funds for dividends  and 
retained  earnings.  Inasmuch as debts are almost  always 
denominated  in money,  to producers  nominal prices matter. 
In the markets  where assets,  financial  and real, are traded 
the prices  are the present  money price  of future money flows.  The market  value of a firm is a capitalization  of 
its nominal  profits  and therefor  is stated  in nominal  terms. 
In a progressive  capitalist  economy  investment  outputs  are a 
part of current  output.  When  investment  outputs  are 
completed  they are assimilated  to the stock of capital 
assets: the investing  firm pays the investment  producer  for 
the investment  good.  This payment  is made with internal 
funds  (retained earnings),  funds raised by the sale of 
equities  and funds raised by debts, either  as borrowings 
from banks  or as the receipts  from the sale of bonds.  At 
the moment  of purchase  the value of a particular  investment 
output  changes  from being determined  by the sales price  to 
being  determined  by the present  value of the future incomes 
that operating  and otherwise using this asset is expected  to 
generate.7 
No one would use current resources  to produce  items for 
the stock of capital  assets if the present  value of capital 
assets,  as determined  by markets  which transform  expected 
future profits  of firms into the market  value of debt and 
equity  liabilities  of firms, is not equal to or greater  than 
the price  the producers  of the investment  good need to 
charge  in order to recover the costs of producing  the 
investment  good and to earn the profits  that enable the 
investment  goods producers  to be viable  firms. 
7.  There  is a normal  capital gain in the shift of the 
valuation  of assets  from the price  of the investment  goods 
to the present  value of future earnings. In a modern  rich capitalist  economy  corporations  are 
the proximate  owners  and the actual operators  of the non- 
housing,  non-agricultural  capital  stock of the economy  and 
the principal  purchasers  of investment  output:  corporations 
are also the principal  proximate  recipients  of capital 
income or gross profits. 
A capitalist  economy  can be viewed  as a set of 
interrelated  balance  sheets and income statements.  There 
are two ultimates  in this formalization:  firms, which  own 
the capital  stock of the economy,  and households,  which  own 
the financial  liabilities  of other units as assets. 
Financial  institutions  stand between  firms and households. 
Today to a large extent the liabilities  (equities and debts) 
of firms are owned by financial  intermediaries  of one type 
or another  and the assets of households  are largely 
liabilities  of financial  intermediaries. 
These  intermediaries  - banks,  savings  institutions, 
insurance  companies,  mutual  funds and pension  funds to 
identify  the most prominent  financial  intermediaries  - are 
self, or profit,  seeking  institutions.  In a modern 
capitalist  economy maximizing  behavior  is not restricted  to 
households  and firms that own capital assets,  for the entire 
array of financial  intermediaries  seeks profits.  Each 
profit  seeking  financial  intermediary  has an agenda  of its 
own: they are not charitable  institutions. 
Of these profit  seeking private  agenda  financial 
organizations  one set plays  an exceptionally  delicate  role in capitalist  economies.  This set consists  of the 
investment  or merchant  bankers  who either  as brokers  - who 
bring buyers  and sellers together  - or dealers  - who take 
financial  liabilities  into their own accounts  - act as 
midwives  to the start up of companies  and the financing  of 
continuing  operations. 
Essentially  these operators  have superior  knowledge 
about their  customers  who need financing  (they have a need 
for funds) and their customers  who have a need  for outlets 
in which money  can be placed.  They turn this private 
knowledge  of the conditions  under which  funds are desired 
and the conditions  under which  funds are available  to their 
own advantage,  even as they perform  the social  function  of 
selecting  the investments  that the economy makes. 
These financial  intermediaries  are of critical 
importance  in determining  the values  attached to capital 
assets as collected  in firms.  In a balance  sheet the 
difference  between  the sum of the values entered  for capital 
and financial  assets and the value of debts on the liability 
side is the book value of the owners  interest  in the firm. 
Dividing  the book value  of the owners equity by the number 
of outstanding  shares yields the book value of a share. 
However  for the main  companies  in a large economy there  is a 
thick market  for equity  shares and this market  value may be 
less than,  equal to or greater than book value.  A main 
consideration  in decisions  to invest is that the market 
valuation  of the capital  assets needs to exceed the supply price  of the investment  output, with a margin  of safety that 
allows  for the riskiness  of the project. 
One consequence  of the introduction  of these  layers of 
profit  seeking organizations  in the markets  which determine 
the value  of financial  instruments  is that the value of 
financial  instruments  and therefor  the value  imputed to 
capital  assets can and does vary independently  of the cost 
of investment  outputs.  Furthermore  the extent to which 
internal  funds are available  to finance  investment  depends 
upon the excess  of anticipated  cash flows from operations 
over the amount needed to service liabilities  that were 
issued to finance  such acquisitions  in the past. 
Because  the capitalization  rate depends  upon present 
views  of the future and the value of the secure assets  in 
portfolios,  the ratio of market price of capital  in firms to 
the market  price  of investment  outputs can vary.  The very 
structuring  of the argument  in terms of a demand  for 
investment  output that depends upon the capitalizing  of 
future profits  and the determination  of the supply price  of 
outputs  as dependent  upon labor costs of producing  these 
outputs  assures that the supply and the demand  relations 
would not,  in economist  jargon, be homogeneous  of degree 
zero in either money  or in money wages.  The result would 
also not be independent  of the extent to which positions  of 
market  power  are capitalized  into the price  level of capital 
assets. Thus 1) the capitalist  technique  of valuing  outputs  and 
valuing  capital  assets,  2) the market  determination  of 
liability  structures  and 3)  the possibility  of sharp 
increases  and decreases  in the market price  of capital 
assets  and financial  instruments  leads to systematic 
increases  and decreases  in the price  of assets relative  to 
the price  level of current output.  This feeds into the 
amount  of investment  financed, which  in turn leads to the 
flow of current profits.8 
Once current profits  fall by enough,  or the carrying 
costs of debts  increases by enough,  so that the cash flows 
earned by operations  or from financial  assets by highly 
indebted  operations  are insufficient  to meet  commitments  on 
liabilities  then the pressure  of the need to validate  debts 
(and to meet withdrawals  by depository  institutions)  leads 
to a proliferation  of attempts to make positions  by selling 
out positions.  The result can be a sharp fall in asset 
values.  A downward  spiral is a possibility  in which 
investment  ceases and profits  evaporate:  the end result  of 
over indebtedness  can be a great or a serious depression. 
Although  the obvious  flaw in capitalism  centers  around  its 
inability  to maintain  a close approximation  to full 
employment,  its deeper  flaw centers  around the way the 
8.  The relation between  the price  level of capital  assets 
and current  output along with other factors determines  the 
volume  of aggregate  demand  and the excess  or deficient 
demand  for labor at the current wage rate.  The excess  or 
deficient  demand will affect the movement  of wages  and thus 
the price  level of investment  output. financial  system affects the prices  and demands  of outputs 
and assets,  so that  from time to time debts and debt 
servicing  rise relative to incomes so that conditions 
conducive  to financial  crises are endogenously  generated. 
Such a crisis,  if not contained by a combination  of Central 
Bank  lender of last resort  interventions,  which  sustain 
asset prices,  and government  deficits,  which  sustain 
profits,  leads first to a collapse  of investment  and then to 
a long lasting depression  accompanied  by mass unemployment. 9 
This financial  flaw cannot be eradicated  from the corporate 
form of market  capitalism,  in which  liabilities  exist that 
are prior  commitments  of the gross nominal profit  flows of 
corporations.  Reforms  which constrain the possibility  of 
using excessive  debts  for specified purposes  were part  of 
the new model  capitalism  of the 1930's.  Many  aspects  of 
these constraints  were relaxed by the 1980's, especially 
critical  constraints  upon the assets eligible  for the 
portfolios  of the Savings and Loan Associations  were 
relaxed.  The result was a series of crises of financial 
institutions  and corporate  indebtedness.  A big depression 
did not happen  in the early  1990's because  the government 
validated  the debts of the financial  institutions  that 
became  insolvent  and the huge government  deficits  sustained 
profits.lO 
9.  In this view the intervention  by a deposit  insurance 
authority  to assure that deposits  at "protected 
institutions"  are paid at par is a central banking  action. 
10.  This validation  has been called a bail out. The new model  capitalism  that emerged  out of the great 
depression  and the second world war had much  larger 
government  sectors than the failed model  of the  1920's. 
Central banks were no longer constrained  by the gold 
standard:  they were now expected  to use their  ability to 
affect the behavior  of banks to sustain  income and 
employment  and contain  any thrust to an accelerating 
inflation  or a deep deflation.  The ability  of a country  to 
float its currency  was much greater  and the responsibility 
for maintaining  aggregate  demand by government  and even by 
international  cooperation  was acknowledged. 
For much  of the period  in which the new interventionist 
model  worked well the sole governor  of the international 
system was the United  States' commitment  to maintain  its 
domestic  economy  at a relatively  close approximation  to full 
employment  and willingness  of the United  States to run a 
trade deficit. 
Capitalism  failed in 1929 because  of the flaw inherent 
in the two price  system nature  of capitalism.  Capitalism 
was reconstructed  in the 1930's and after World War  II with 
a much greater  government  sector, which  in the United  States 
was largely devoted to sustaining  consumption  and military 
spending.  Nevertheless  private  investment  remained  the 
major  determinant  of the increase  in productive  capacity  and 
the value  of private  investment  still rested upon the price 
level of capital  assets being greater than the supply price 
of investment  outputs.  The flaw that over indebtedness  can lead to a sharp decline  in the ability to validate  debts  and 
therefor  to a sharp fall in the value of capital  assets  as 
collected  in firms remained. 
The recent history  of the United  States is a history  of 
a thrust  towards  a debt deflation  that was contained  by a 
combination  of central bank  intervention  and massive 
government  deficits.  The contained  depression  of the early 
1990's ultimately  led to a sharp fall in first short term 
interest  rates that, with a lag, is being  followed by a fall 
in longer term interest  rates.  11  This fall in interest 
rates  led to a rise in the present  values  of income streams: 
Asset  values  increased  and as a result the turbulence  in 
financial  markets  in the United  States has abated. 
The capitalism  that  failed over 1929-33 was a small 
government  constrained  Central Bank essentially  laissez- 
faire economy.  The capitalism  that had a good run after the 
second world war was a big government  interventionist 
economy  with central banks that were less constrained  than 
during  the inter war years. 
The post World War II model 
successful  over the first twenty 
of capitalism  was so 
plus years after the War 
that  some are given to calling that period  a Golden Age. 
While  in truth  it was not a utopian  Golden Age, each of us 
can find fault with some details  of the economy  of the 
11.  S Jay and David Levy  "How to Restore  Long-Term 
Prosperity  in the United  States and Overcome  the Contained 
Depression  of the 1990's", The Jerome Levy Economics 
Institute,  Annandale-on-Hudson,  New York 12504 1950's and 1960's,  it might very well be a practical  best. 
On an absolute  scale the most recent twenty plus years after 
World War  II were not bad, but they suffer by comparison. 
However  a clear path of deterioration  is discernible  over 
these years,  in part because  of policies  such as those which 
Reagan  and Thatcher  exemplify,  in part because  of the way in 
which protracted  success  leads to an acceptance  of 
commitments  to pay which erode the margins  of safety which 
make  capitalist  firms and financial  institutions  resilient. 
The junk bond episodes  and the commercial  construction 
excesses  are built  into the way in which business  men and 
bankers  interact  in a capitalist  economy.  Only capitalist 
economies  in which the regulatory  agencies have  stronger  and 
more  sophisticated  controls than the regulatory  agencies 
have  in the United  States can avoid the financial  excesses 
that bring  financially  complex economies  to the brink  of 
collapse. 
"Why are the welfare  states of post World War  II 
capitalist  economies  now in crisis?  " is the fifth question. 
I can answer  for the United  States.  The Social Security 
system, which  is the keystone  of the welfare  state in the 
United  States, was never adjusted  for the enormous  increase 
in life expectancy  over the past sixty years.  If the life 
expectancies  now were as they were  60 years ago there would 
be no crisis  in the social security part of the United 
States' welfare  state.  The solution to this is rather 
simple:  increase the age at which people  retire.  However this would  increase the labor force.  Therefor  there  is a 
need to increase the number  of available  jobs. 
Another  problem  of the welfare  state in the United 
States  is with what is called welfare  in the United  States. 
This system, Aid to Families  with Dependent  Children  (AFDC), 
provides  cash and in kind  (medical care, housing  and food 
subsidies)  support to families with children,  if income  from 
work or assets  is not able to support the children.  In 
practice  a significant  part of the population  that  is 
welfare  dependent  is seemingly  locked into a pattern  of 
dependency:  women who themselves  were illegitimate  and 
recipients  of AFDC having  children  on AFDC.  This welfare 
problem  is increasingly  viewed as a disaster  in terms  of the 
well being  of the recipients.  However the alternative  to 
welfare  is work for the mother  and child care for the 
children. 
Welfare  reform  leads to a similar problem  as social 
security  reform.  Having people now on welfare  or on Social 
Security  enter the labor force increases the demand  for 
jobs.  The problems  of the welfare  state in the United 
States  stem from the inability to achieve and sustain  a 
tight  full employment  without  triggering  inflation. 
We now live in a world where  less than 3% of the United 
States'  labor force is in agriculture  and where an ever 
decreasing  percentage  of workers  can produce  all of the 
standard manufactured  goods that the economy  demands.  There 
is a need to support more workers  in the production  of socially useful  outputs that are not manufactured  goods  and 
where the costs may not be recoverable  by any fee for 
services  arrangement.  In the United  States military 
spending  on both weapons  and manpower  supported  workers 
whose  costs were not covered by a fee for services 
arrangement:  taxes  and government  indebting  raised the funds 
for such expenditures.  There is a need to replace the 
military  use of available  resources  with other forms of use 
which do not depend upon fees for services  for funding. 
There is one crisis  in America's  welfare  state which  is 
different  in kind than those  in Europe.  During World War  II 
the United  States began  job related health  care "insurance" 
and job related  supplements  to Social Security  in the form 
of pensions  that were liabilities  of corporations. 
Corporations  also took responsibilities  for the health  care 
of their  retired workers.  These pensions  were not funded 
until the 1970's and even now many are only partially 
funded.  These pensions  typically  are vested  after quite a 
few years  on the  job and until recently were not portable. 
Over the past  several years a large number  of the greatest 
corporations  of the United  States have had serious  financial 
difficulties.  Some have gone through bankruptcy  and others 
have downsized  dramatically.  Firms have taken drastic  steps 
to reduce not only their shop floor workers but also their 
overheads.  The security  of employment  in the United  States 
was never  as great as in the Japanese  system, but it 
certainly  was much greater  in the past than it is today. The newly  revealed vulnerability  of corporations  means 
that the private  pension  and health care systems  of the post 
war period  are no longer viable.  The Clinton  administration 
is attacking  the problems  of our health  care system.  As yet 
there  is no serious  attack on the problems  of the pension 
system that supplements  Social Security. 
The Clinton  administration  is a repudiation  of the 
economics  and the social policies  of the Reagan-Bush  years. 
It accepts that there are government  functions  which  are 
legacies  of the past which need to be cut if not eliminated. 
There  is also a recognition  that programs  like welfare, 
social  security  and health  care require reformulation.  A 
big issue as yet not addressed  is how is the United  States 
going to administer  the industrial policy which up to now 
has been  carried  in the military  budget. 
The United  States still has an unrivaled  resource  in 
the depth and wide distribution  of research universities. 
Many  of these  state universities  have strong applied 
research  interests,  usually  in fields that are closely 
related to the state's economy.  The harnessing  of the power 
to create  and innovate  of such universities  and the 
transformation  of the development  arms of the defense 
department  into a civilian  advanced project  agency are 
frontiers  that the Clinton Administration  will have to 
address  as they fully develop what they mean by industrial 
policy. The end result of the Clinton  administration  is likely 
to be a new model  capitalism  that takes the model that was 
built  in the  1930's and 40's as a taking  off place.  This 
new model  will not repudiate nor attempt to dismantle  the 
old new model,  which was the aim of Reagan.  The new model 
of capitalism  will explicitly  recognize that the achievement 
of a full employment  economy will have to come from 
organizations  that are not typical private  corporations  and 
not government  departments  as we have understood  them  in the 
United  States. 
Initially  the corporation  was a private  organization 
chartered  by a special act to carry out a public  function. 
We can expect the new model  capitalism  to create 
corporations  which mix private  and public  funding to carry 
out programs  that have a social purpose.  We can see 
glimpses  of this in ideas that are floating  for health 
maintenance  organizations,  for the development  of 
technologies  and for community  development  banking.  It is 
not a matter  of picking  winners  in some technological 
struggle but rather a matter  of defining  needs that can be 
filled with known techniques  but which require  special 
organizations  to carry them out. 
There may well be some experimentation  in taxation. 
The progressive  income tax was compromised  by Reagan.  The 
argument  that income should not be taxed but that 
consumption  is a fairer basis  for taxation  is gaining  some 
following.  It is doubtful  whether the political  courage exists to recognize  that the logic of a consumption  tax 
requires  that the fair rental value of owner occupied 
housing  enter  into the base used for the calculation  of the 
tax.  However  a thorough  and logical consumption  based tax 
system would  simultaneously  reintroduce  meaningful 
progression  into the tax system and cut through  the 
confusions  relating  to pension  schemes.  As was mentioned 
earlier,  pensions  are a policy problem  due to the American 
system of a government  Social Security  system supplemented 
by private  pension  schemes, which are publicly  supported  by 
the way taxable  income of corporations  and households  are 
calculated. 
The Clinton Administration  is in a tentative  way trying 
to discover  the contours  of a new model  of capitalism:  I 
don't think  it is a conscious  quest as yet.  But as one item 
in the menu of unmet needs  leads to another a new model  will 
emerge which  is more explicit  in the partnership  of public 
and private  agencies  in the development  of resources  than 
anything  we have had in the United  States to date. 